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Abstract—With the growth of modern systems and infrastruc-
tures, automated and intelligent response systems become the
holy grail of the security community. An interesting approach
proposes to use dynamic access control policies to specify
response policies for such systems. These policies should be
enforced when an ongoing attack, that threatens the monitored
system, is detected. However, existing work do not present a clear
methodology to specify the Response policies. In particular, the
deactivation issue is not yet tackled. In this paper, we first present
how to specify response policies. Second, a risk-aware framework
is proposed to activate and deactivate response policies. Hence,
the success likelihood of the threat, and the cumulative impact
of both of the threat and the response, are all considered.
Index Terms—Response policy, threat and response contexts,
activation/deactivation, cumulative impact, success likelihood.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information systems, critical services and infrastructure
are continuously growing in size and complexity. Network
operators are providing a wide range of services such as voice
(VoIP) or television (TVoIP) based on these systems. Unfortu-
nately, they remain always an attractive target for hackers and
criminal organizations. The attacks may be accurately pointed,
or performed at a large scale. Therefore, a proper and efficient
response system becomes primordial, to insure the availability
and the security of these systems and the provided services.
This interesting issue has been driving the research com-
munity to propose several intelligent response models. These
response models aim to identify and select the most efficient
countermeasure(s), in order to stop the detected attack or
mitigate its impact. For instance [1] presents an adaptive
intrusion response model that considers the intrusion’s spread,
using intrusion graphs. On the other hand, models that adopts a
cost-benefit approach have been proposed: [2], [3], [4], [5], and
[6] consider the cost (or the impact) of the detected attack and
the candidate countermeasure(s). [7] and [8] consider service
dependencies to calculate more accurately the impact of the
attack and the candidate countermeasure(s). Moreover, [9] and
[10] propose to consider the risk of the ongoing attack; in other
words they combine the impact with the success likelihood of
ongoing attacks to assess dynamically the risk(s).
On the other hand, a different approach has been proposed
in [11]. The response, as presented in this paper, is based on
activating and enforcing dynamic policies to counter an attack.
We view this approach more global than the previous models
above. While the previous models have a local and limited
scope on the monitored system (i.e. tactical), the latter has a
far larger scope and acts as ‘strategic’ response model. [12]
and [13] show that the two approaches are complementary,
and combine them in a single response workflow. Thus,
response may be performed at two levels: intermediate level
(i.e. tactical) and high level (i.e. strategic). The former is based
upon launching single and local countermeasures, while the
latter is policy-based and may affect the entire system.
However, several interesting issues have been raised. First,
the aforementioned papers do not consider the deactivation
of these policies during specification. Second, these papers
propose to activate a strategic response upon receiving and
correlating the alerts that correspond to executed attacks.
However these alerts may represent ongoing attacks that
have a minor (or null) chance to succeed, given the attack
progress and the real-time state of the monitored system.
Third, previous work raise the deactivation issue, but they do
not indicate how and when the strategic (i.e. policy-based)
response should be deactivated. For instance, [11] relies on
experts to assign static lifetime for the response policies, which
is not satisfactory. Moreover, during the deactivation process
of a strategic response, the system (or the administrator) may
encounter the following cases: (i) some actions once activated,
cannot be (simply) deactivated, or (ii) the expert needs to
specify some actions that have to be executed only when the
response is deactivated, but not before (e.g. notify the users
that the service is back to normal).
In this paper, we first present how to specify response poli-
cies for complex systems, while considering the deactivation
process. Then, we propose an online model with an associated
architecture, which activates and deactivates response policies
(i.e. strategic responses), using a risk-aware approach: the
success likelihood of the ongoing threat/attack, and the cumu-
lative impacts (i.e. cost) of the threat and the response, are all
considered before activating/deactivating strategic response.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II summarizes
the state of the art of policy models, while Section III presents
how response policies may be controlled, by proposing a
response taxonomy. Section IV shows how to specify threat
and response contexts. Section V defines a risk-aware frame-
work to activate and deactivate threat contexts and response
contexts. Section VI proposes an architecture to implement the
activation and deactivation framework. Section VII presents a
VoIP case study to illustrate our work.
2II. SECURITY AND RESPONSE POLICY MODELS
To specify security and response requirements, several
policy-based models may be used (e.g. RBAC [14], Ponder
[15] and OrBAC [16]). However, RBAC and Ponder suffer
from several drawbacks. First, they offer only a single di-
mension of abstraction, using roles assigned to subjects. Such
abstraction is not offered for other entities (i.e. objects and
actions). Obviously, this limitation will multiply significantly
the number of security rules for a given policy. Second, RBAC
does not consider the concept of organization. Therefore,
the specification and the management of security policies
for large and multi-regional systems, become tedious tasks.
Finally, the dynamic nature of the response cannot be modeled
with RBAC. For example, once an ongoing attack has been
detected, a set of rules should be activated and enforced.
On the other hand, OrBAC does not suffer from the afore-
mentioned limitations. It is expressive enough to specify a
large variety of security requirements. In fact, it has been
successfully applied to specify network access control policies.
Moreover, translation mechanisms were defined to automat-
ically generate firewall configuration rules that are free of
inconsistency and redundancy [17]. Thus, we will use OrBAC
in the remainder of this paper. We present below a brief
description of the OrBAC Model. For more details and formal
description, interested readers may refer to [16] and [18].
A. The OrBAC Model
OrBAC is a security policy model centered on the concept
of organization. Using OrBAC, security policies are specified
at an abstract level. A concrete level policy may be inferred
to enforce them in the monitored system.
Therefore, one of the OrBAC contributions is the abstraction
of the traditional triples (subject, action, object) into (role,
activity, view) . The entities subject, action and object are
called concrete entities whereas the entities role, activity and
view are called organizational (i.e. abstract) entities. A view
is a set of objects that possess the same security-related
properties within an organization. Thus, these objects are
accessed in the same way. Abstracting them into a view avoids
the need to write one rule for each of them. Another useful
abstraction is that of action into activity. An activity (e.g.
call) is considered as an operation which is implemented by
one of the actions available in the organization (e.g. SIP call,
NoE call and H323 call)1. Therefore, they can be abstracted
with a unique activity for which we may define a single
security rule.
Another main contribution of the OrBAC model is the
concept of context, that reduces the applicability of the rules
to some specific circumstances [18]. Using OrBAC, the expert
can specify contextual abstract security rules:
• permission(org, R, A, V, Ctx) means that in organization
org, the role R is authorized to perform the activity A, on
the view V, when the context Ctx is activated.
• prohibition(org, R, A, V, Ctx) means that in organization
org, the role R is NOT authorized to perform the activity
A, on the view V, when the context Ctx is activated.
1SIP, NoE and H.323 are signaling protocols used in VoIP systems
• obligation(org, R, A, V, Ctx, Ctxv) means that in orga-
nization org, the role R MUST perform the activity A,
on the view V. The obligation context Ctx represents the
set of conditions for which, the obligation holds. The
violation context Ctxv represents the set of conditions
for which, and while the obligation holds, the obligation
is violated. Interested readers may refer to [19] for a
complete description of obligations.
For example, prohibition(vodaphone; normal client,
SIP call, Internet, Response SIP DoS) means that all normal
clients of Vodaphone are not authorized to call using SIP
protocol, if the SIP server was the target of a DoS attack.
Once the policy has been specified at the organizational
level, it can be instantiated by assigning concrete entities to
abstract entities and activating the needed context(s). Three
predicates have been defined (empower, consider and use) to
assign respectively a subject to a role, an action to an activity,
and an object to a view:
• empower(org, S, R) specifies that in organization org,
subject S is empowered in role R.
• consider(org, A’, A) specifies that in organization org,
action A’ implements activity A.
• use(org, O, V) specifies that in organization org, object
O is used in view V.
For example: empower(vodaphone, 5322@vodaphone.com,
normal client) means that 5322@vodaphone.com is a normal
client in the operator’s network.
III. USAGE OF ORBAC FOR POLICY-BASED RESPONSE
For any system, OrBAC may be used to specify the Op-
erational Policy (OP), and the Response Policy (RP). The
former is used to specify the security rules during ‘normal’
circumstances. The associated contexts might be for example
geographic (e.g. on site, or outside), temporal (e.g. work-
ing hours, holidays), etc. On the other hand, the RP specifies
the response rules that must be activated and enforced to
counter each detected threat. Thus, each context in RP is
specified to handle a potential threat. In the remainder of this
paper, we will refer only to the RP. The expert has to associate
the appropriate response rules to each response context, which
in turn is associated to a threat context. A response context is
activated only if the associated threat context has been already
activated. However, in a monitored system, a threat could be
detected (and therefore the associated context is activated),
while the associated response context remains inactive due
to other reasons (e.g. the strategic response cost exceeds that
of the threat; or to avoid major conflicts because another
strategic response has already been activated). This point will
be clarified in the remainder of the paper.
In the first section of this paper, we mentioned the deac-
tivation issue: how and when a response policy should be
deactivated? It should be noticed that the deactivation of
policy-based (i.e. strategic) responses is not a trivial task.
In other words, the deactivation of a response policy (or
more precisely a response context) does not simply consist










Fig. 1. Temporal Response Taxonomy.
• The expert needs to launch some actions only at the
activation (or only at the deactivation) of a response
policy (e.g. notify a user to change his password).
• Whether it is impossible, or it is considered a tedious task
that may impact the OP (i.e. the expert’s intervention is
needed to end the response), some of the response rules
or countermeasures cannot be deactivated (e.g. patch a
software, patch an OS, remove permanently a client from
the database).
• Some of the response rules or countermeasures have a
very limited lifetime, and therefore are considered as au-
tomatically deactivated (e.g. close a malicious connection,
restart a server, change a password).
Therefore, a simple yet efficient solution is to specify for
each response context, two associated event-based contexts:
Start(response context), and End(response context). They cor-
respond respectively to the activation and the deactivation
of response context. [20] propose an operational semantic to
specify event-based contexts associated to state-based contexts
using the ECA (Event-Condition-Action) formalism [21]. The
formal definition of this operational semantic is not in the
scope of this paper due to space limitation. Now, we will
present first a taxonomy for reactions and countermeasures.
This will allow us to classify them with respect to their
lifetime, and whether their lifetime is controllable or not.
A. Response Taxonomy
There are many papers that present reaction and response
taxonomies, like [22] and [23]. However, none of them men-
tioned the lifetime of the countermeasures, or whether they
can be deactivated. We propose a taxonomy that considers
the temporal dimension of the response actions. We may refer
to this taxonomy (See Figure 1) to classify any reaction or
countermeasure. Thus, it may be also used to classify any
security rule expressed in the RP, w.r.t. their lifetime and the
controllability of their lifetime.
First, considering their lifetime, countermeasures (or reac-
tions) may be divided initially into two major classes: one-shot
countermeasures and sustainable countermeasures.
1) One-Shot countermeasures: A reaction has a one-shot
lifetime when its effectiveness is limited to a single attack
occurrence. Once a one-shot reaction is launched, it is auto-
matically deactivated. The effective lifetime of this class of
reactions is null (or negligible). That means future attacks
may occur, as if this reaction was not launched. Therefore,
a one-shot response has to be launched for each occurrence
of the same attack. Examples of this class include: closing
a malicious connection, restarting a server, notifying the
administrator, etc. Let us consider a perfect system, where
A is a set of (the same) attack occurrences, and CM the
associated countermeasure occurrence. We define a relation
f : A→ CM . This relation can be read as “an element from
A is ended by an element from CM”. In a perfect system,
each attack must be ended, and thus f is an application:
Hypothesis 1: ∀ a ∈ A,∃! cm ∈ CM | cm = f(a)
For each occurrence a of the attack A, a cm is required to end
the attack. Therefore a cmi that ended the attack occurrence
ai, has no effect on future attack aj (j > i). One-shot
countermeasure can be defined with the following proposition
which demonstrates that f is injective:
Proposition 1: ∀ ai, aj ∈ A; cmi = f(ai) and
cmi = f(aj)⇒ ai = aj
2) Sustainable countermeasures: A reaction has a sustain-
able lifetime when its effectiveness is not limited to a single
attack occurrence. Once a sustainable reaction is activated,
it remains active against future attack occurrences. In other
words, its lifetime sustains for a period of time (which may
be almost infinite). Therefore, the activation of a sustainable
reaction may be effective against future attack occurrences,
until this reaction is deactivated. Examples of this class
include: patching software, blocking a machine, deleting an
account, suspending an account, etc. Let us define the same
function f : A→ CM . f is not injective because a sustainable
countermeasure cmi can end a sequence of attack occurrences
{ai, ai+1, ...} that occur during cmi lifetime. In other words,
we can have several attack occurrences that are ended by the
same countermeasure occurrence:
Proposition 2: ∃ ai, aj ∈ A | (cmi = f(ai)) and
(cmi = f(aj)) and (ai 6= aj)
Moreover, sustainable class may be divided into two sub-
classes:
a) Defeasible: A defeasible reaction can be deactivated,
and therefore its lifetime may be controlled by the adminis-
trator or the system. Examples of this class include: blocking
a machine, suspending an account, dropping traffic etc.
b) Indefeasible: An indefeasible reaction cannot be de-
activated, or the deactivation of such reaction requires ex-
ceptional effort or policy modification(s). Examples of this
class include: deleting an account, patching an OS, patching
a software, etc.
IV. POLICY-BASED RESPONSE SPECIFICATION
In [11], response contexts were associated with an alert
signatures. This would lead inevitably toward a huge number
of contexts to manage. Moreover, the activation of the context
is triggered with the detection of an attack, which is surely not
very effective considering the high number of failed attempts
to attack a complex system. Second, the same attack may be
carried out using different exploits and techniques. However,
the response policy against all these attacks will be the same.
Moreover, even if an attack action (or step in a larger scenario)
has been detected, it may be useless to launch the associated
4strategic response; because the attacker will not be able to
achieve his goal due to other reasons (e.g. another essential
attack action is not executable on the monitored system,
another response is already activated). Thus a response policy
may be activated, only if the associated threat context has been
activated. The latter is activated if the success likelihood of the
ongoing attack [24] exceeds a predefined threshold.
Now we show how to define the threat contexts, and the
associated response contexts.
A. Threat Specification
First, the expert identifies the threats that may violate
the system’s security and operation (using for instance a
preliminary risk analysis). For example, a partial or total DoS,
SPIT (Spam over IP Telephony) and toll fraud are identified
as potential threats in a VoIP environment. For each threat,
the expert creates an associated attack objective, in order to
be used by alert correlation models based on attack graphs
generation [25] [26] [27]. Usually, attack objectives are the
terminal nodes in an attack graph, and they violate the security
and operational policy of the monitored system. They can be
formally defined, using one of the attack description languages
(e.g. LAMBDA [27]). LAMBDA uses first-order logic predi-
cates to model the system’s state, adopting a pre/postcondition
approach. For instance, DNS DoS may be caused if host is a
DNS server, and host is the target of a DoS attack:
-Precondition: dns server(host), target(host)
-Postcondition: dns dos(host)
Finally the expert has to specify, for each attack objective,
two event-based contexts:
• Start(Threati): This context is triggered when an ongoing
threat i is detected with a high success likelihood to
accomplish its attack objective.
• End(Threati): This context is triggered when an ongoing
threat i disappears.
The triggering mechanisms of these two contexts will be
defined in Section V-A.
B. Response Specification
The expert specifies the response rules associated with each
Responsei, that aims to counter and handle Threati. Similarly,
Responsei will be activated and deactivated:
• Start(Responsei): This context is activated when the
administrator (or the system) decides to handle and
counter Threati. In consequence, all the response rules
associated to Responsei will be activated and deployed
in the monitored system.
• End(Responsei): This context is activated when the ad-
ministrator (or the system) decides to cease the response.
In consequence, all the response rules that were activated
previously (via Start(Responsei)) will be deactivated.
The triggering mechanisms of these two contexts will be
defined in Section V-B.
The expert may also add explicitly ‘new’ response rules
that will be only activated at the end of the response. These
response rules should be associated to the ¬Responsei con-
text, to express the fact that they should be only enforced
when Responsei is deactivated (thus when End(Responsei) is
triggered). Let us suppose that α is a response context, and






As mentioned in Section II-A, there are three types of
response rules that can be associated with any response context
Responsei in the Response Policy (RP): permissions, prohibi-
tions and obligations. When End(Responsei) is activated, all
the permissions and prohibitions that were previously activated
by Start(Responsei), are deactivated. In other words, we do
not need to specify explicitly new response rules that have
an opposite ‘effect’ on the system [20]. However, the case of
obligations need a deeper examination, and sometimes explicit
response rule(s) must be explicitly specified.
In fact, for each obligation rule associated with Responsei,
we have to check first the type of its activity or action, using
the taxonomy presented in Section III-A. Therefore there are
three types of obligations: (i) one-shot, (ii) defeasible, and (iii)
indefeasible.
First, the deactivation process of defeasible obligations is
possible. The associated obligations in the context ¬Responsei
can be expressed by another obligation obligation(org, R, A,
V, ¬Responsei, Responsei); where A cancels the defeasible
activity (e.g. block/allow traffic, activate/deactivate a backup
server)
Proposition 3: if obligation(org, R, A, V, Responsei,
¬Responsei) then obligation(org, R, A, V, ¬Responsei,
Responsei)
We notice that obligation(org, R, A, V, Responsei,
¬Responsei) holds when Start(Responsei) has been activated,
and the violation context of this obligation is ¬Responsei: this
means that this obligation must be fulfilled before the end of
response i (i.e. before the triggering of End(Responsei)).
On the other hand, obligation(org, R, A, V, ¬Responsei,
Responsei) holds when ¬Responsei is activated, while its
violation context is Responsei: this means that this obligation
must be fulfilled before another (future) start of response i.
Second, for one-shot obligations (e.g. kill shell, close con-
nection, restart server), the deactivation is ‘implicitly’ per-
formed, due to the limited lifetime of such obligations:
Proposition 4: if obligation(org, R, A, V, Responsei,
¬Responsei) then no correspondent obligation has to be
associated with ¬(Responsei)
Finally for indefeasible obligations, no deactivation can be
done (or it cannot be specified in the Security and Opera-
tional Policy). However the administrator must review (and
potentially update) the system policy POL that contains the
Operational Policy OP and the Response Policy RP, to take in
consideration the permanent obligations that have been acti-
vated. For example, when a server is patched, the associated
threat context may need to be updated. Another example, when
a malicious employee John is fired, subject John is removed
from the system. We consider that, so far, these updates can
not be automated.
5Proposition 5: if obligation(org, R, A, V, Responsei,
¬Responsei)) then obligation(org, admin, review, POL,
¬Responsei, Responsei)
V. CONTEXT TRIGGERING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present a model that handles the activa-
tion and deactivation of threat contexts and response contexts.
Therefore, we determine for each predefined context, when
it should be triggered. A risk-aware approach is adopted: we
consider the impact and the Success Likelihood (SL) of the
ongoing threat, and the impact of the associated response.
A. Triggering Threat Contexts
The success likelihood (SL) of an attack objective i can
be calculated in real-time, considering the attack progress
and the state of the system. Such model was proposed in
[24]: the generated attack graph is first transformed into
dynamic Markov Models. Then, the Mean Time to each Attack
Objective (MTAO) is calculated using the markovian transition
and sojourn matrices derived from the attack graph. Afterward,
the success likelihood SL of each attack objective AOi (and
thus of each Threati) is calculated using a logarithmic scale
(See [24] for more information):






A high SL means that the threat is close to achieve its
objective. When the SL of Threati, calculated in real-time,
exceeds a predefined threshold, Start(Threati) context should
be activated. The expert may tune this threshold (for example
using machine learning techniques).
Proposition 6: If (SLThreati > activ) then Start(Threati) is
true
Every threat or response has an impact on the security prop-
erties of the system (i.e. confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity). We rely on existing assessment models, which consider
the assets and services dependency in the monitored system, to
evaluate the impact of the attack and the response [7] and [8].
Therefore it is possible, for each attack objective, to calculate
the variation of the confidentiality level δC, integrity level δI
and availability level δA in the monitored system. For instance,
[7] and [8] model first the monitored system (or service), as a
set of resources R. A resource may be a service instance or a
user. The existing dependencies between all the resources inR
may be specified using dependency matrices. All dependency
types are considered (mandatory, alternative, combined, etc.).
If one resource in the system is targeted by an attack, the
direct impact on this resource will propagate to other resources
through the existing dependencies (thus inducing an indirect
impact). These models calculate, using Breadth First Search
(BFS) algorithms, the indirect impact of a given attack on the
entire system. Therefore the overall impact (which is the sum
of direct and indirect impacts) on confidentiality δC, integrity
δI and availability δA incurred by the entire system, can be
calculated. Interested readers may refer to these paper for
further details. Nevertheless, we may simply rely on experts’
knowledge to assign, for each threat, static (i.e. a priori) δC,
δI and δA. Thus, we may consider that δC, δI and δA for
each threat, as input for our triggering framework.
The impact of an attack (or a response rule), is not constant:
the longer the attack lasts (or the response is enforced), the
higher is its impact. Therefore when a Threati is detected
(thus Start(Threati) has been activated), its Cumulative Impact
CI starting from the activation time Tstart threat, can be




(δC(u) + δI(u) + δA(u)) du (3)
On the other hand, End(Threati) should be activated if the
SL drops below another threshold deactiv . deactiv may be
equal to activ; however there is the risk of quick switching be-
tween the activation and deactivation when the SL varies con-
tinually around activ . Therefore, it is advised to set deactiv
slightly lower than activ (hysteresis effect): this guarantees a
fixed delay between the activation and the deactivation.
Proposition 7: if [(Start(Threati) is true) and (SLThreati <
deactiv)] then End(Threati) is true
B. Triggering Response Contexts
In this Section, we define when a policy-based response
should be activated or deactivated. Therefore, we have
to specify, for each response context Responsei associated
with Threati, when the two contexts Start(Responsei) and
End(Responsei) should be activated.
First, a Responsei should be activated, when Threati is
active and the associated impact exceeds a predefined impact
threshold κmin that the expert may tune. A very low κmin will
cause the activation of a response context even against minor
attacks which may be handled by tactical response. On the
other hand, a very high κmin will turn the strategic response
useless or rarely applied. A good practice is to set κmin as
the deployment cost of the response policy.
Proposition 8: if [(Start(Threati) is true) and
(CIThreati > κmin)] then Start(Responsei) is true
Now, we have to evaluate the policy-based response impact
on the system. Given that a policy-based response is a set of
response rules, we can assess the δC, δI and δA induced by
each response rule, using one of the aforementioned impact
assessment models (See Section V-A). Therefore, the CI of
a given security rule u, starting from the activation time




(δC(u) + δI(u) + δA(u)) du (4)
For example, in a VoIP service environment, let us consider
an ongoing attack that threatens the users’ hardphones. A
simple response may consists of two response rules:
• prohibition(client, hardph call, Internet, hardph threat resp)
• permission(client, softph call, Internet, hardph threat resp)
The first rule prohibits the clients from using the hardphone,
and therefore induces a sharp fall in the availability level
δArule1 < 0, while there is no impact on the confidentiality or
6integrity level (δCrule1 = δIrule1 = 0). The second rule per-
mits the clients to use their softphone, therefore this response
rule induces a raise in the availability level δArule2 > 0.
However, the second rule cannot fully compensate the first
rule, because not all the clients have an installed softphone.
It is obvious that the impact metrics δC, δI and δA are
proportional to the deployed response rules, which is propor-
tional to the number of subjects (e.g. clients) affected by the
response. Moreover, δC, δI and δA depend on the type of the
subjects (i.e. roles); for instance the cost incurred by a loss
of confidentiality is not the same for a premium user and a
normal user.
We define the overall Cumulative Impact at time t, for
Responsei, as the summation of cumulative impact of the





Finally, End(Responsei) should be launched, when the as-
sociated threat i had vanished (or its SL is negligible) or the
impact of response i exceeds that of the threat i:
Proposition 9: if (Start(Responsei) is true) and
[(End(Threati) is true) or (CIResponsei (t) > CIThreati (t))]
then End(Responsei) is true
VI. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
We propose an online architecture, to activate and deactivate
policy-based response using the presented model. Figure 2
illustrates the proposed architecture:






































Fig. 2. Proposed Architecture to Activate and Deactivate Policy-based
Response.
a) Online Alert Correlation: This module collects the
generated alerts and correlates them, to construct the graph of
ongoing threats and attacks.
b) Success Likelihood Assessment: This module evalu-
ates in real-time the success likelihood of ongoing threats,
using the attack graphs generated by the Alert Correlation
module. For instance, the model presented in [24] can be used.
c) OrBAC Security and Response Policy: This database
stores the response rules of the OP and RP, which are specified
as presented in Section IV.
d) Attack Impact Assessment: This modules assesses the
variations of confidentiality δC, integrity δI , and availability
δA levels induced by the attack. The values may be stati-
cally defined, or measured online. For instance, the models
presented in [7] or [8] can be used.
e) Response Impact Assessment: Similarly to the previ-
ous module, this module assesses the variations of confiden-
tiality δC, integrity δI , and availability δA levels due to the
activation of a response policy.
f) Policy Instantiation Engine: This module instantiates
abstract response rules (specified with roles, views and activ-
ities) into concrete rules (with subjects, objects and actions).
g) Threat Context Handler: This module activates and
deactivates the threat contexts (i.e.
Start(Threati) and End(Threati)), and calculates the cumula-
tive impact of the threat (See Section V-A).
h) Response Context Handler: This module activates
and deactivates the response contexts Start(Responsei) and
End(Responsei), and calculates the cumulative impact of the
response (See Section V-B).
i) Policy Decision Point: This module selects the op-
timal set of PEPs in order to deploy the activated response
rules. Then, the module generates the appropriate scripts to
reconfigure these PEPs, in order to enforce the activation (or
deactivation) of response rules in the monitored system [28].
j) Policy Enforcement Point: These modules are recon-
figured, using the scripts generated by the previous module,
in order to enforce OrBAC rules, and thus to activate or to
deactivate response polices in the monitored system [12], [13].
VII. CASE STUDY: VOIP SERVICE
We consider the VoIP service of a mid-size company with
1000 clients as a case study. SIP is used as the Signaling
protocol, and the media is transported using RTP or SRTP
protocols. We suppose that each client is subscribed with one
of the two available account types: premium accounts (20%
of clients) for business use, and normal account (80% of
clients) for personal use. In normal circumstances (i.e. nominal
context), premium and normal accounts are allowed to make
standard or secured calls. Thus, the Operational Policy2 OP
will be:
• permission(premium, call3, all, nominal)
• permission(premium, secure call, all, nominal)
• permission(normal, call, all, nominal)
• permission(normal, secure call, all, nominal)
First, Section VII-A shows threats identification, and the speci-
fication of one of these threats. Second, Section VII-B presents
2The organization has been omitted since the case study treats a single
organization
3For simplicity, we consider the activities call and secure call includes
making a call, and receiving a call.
7the associated response policy specification. Finally, Section
VII-C presents how the latter response policy is activated and
deactivated, in three different scenarios.
A. Threat Specification
First, the expert identifies the following potential attack
objectives:
1) SPIT (Spam over IP Telephony) Storm
2) Conversation Tapping (Internal Attack)
3) Audio Injecting - Mixing (Internal Attack)
4) Server partial Denial of Service
5) Client Toll Fraud
6) Client Account highjack
The first attack consists of sending Spam over IP Telephony
(SPIT), which definitely annoys the clients. Regular SPIT at-
tacks with no proper response may cause the clients to change
the operator. The second attack violates the confidentiality of
the calls; while the third attack consist of injecting audio to
an established call between two parties (and thus violates the
integrity of the calls). It is obvious that the second and third
attacks are not tolerable especially for the premium clients.
The objective of the forth attack is to cause a partial (or total)
DoS on SIP servers, and thus violates the availability of the
VoIP service for all the clients. The fifth and sixth attack
objectives aim a victim user whose account had been already
compromised.
We decide to retain the first four attack objectives to
be handled as strategic threats, and therefore we proceed
to define the associated contexts. The remaining two attack
objectives will be handled by the administrator with local
countermeasure(s). Therefore, there is no need to specify the
associated strategic responses. Due to space limitation, we will
proceed with the specification of the last retained threat (i.e.
Server partial Denial of Service):
• if (SLThreat4 > 5) then Start(Threat4)
• if [Start(Threat4) and (SLThreat4 < 4)] then End(Threat4)
B. Response Specification
The expert must specify the Response Policy RP using Or-
BAC, to enforce a set of response rules for each of the previous
four threats. The expert may specify the same response for
several threats at the same time. In this case study, we decide
that the second and third threats should be associated with the
same response. Due to space limitation, we will proceed with
the specification of the last response policy associated to the
retained threat in Section VII-A (i.e. Server partial Denial of
Service).
1) RespC: This strategic response is used when the system
is under considerable (or even near total) DoS. According to
this response, the system must allow only the premium clients
to perform and receive calls. However, they are prohibited
to perform secure calls, due to their greater resources con-
sumption. Moreover, during these harsh conditions, normal
clients are prohibited to perform or receive calls. Therefore,
the response rules that must be enforced are RespC :
• Prohibition(premium, secure call, all, RespC )
• Obligation(admin, startC notify, premium, RespC , ¬RespC )
• Prohibition(normal, call, all, RespC )
• Prohibition(normal, secure call, all, RespC )
• Obligation(admin, startC notify, normal, RespC , ¬RespC )
On the other hand, when the administrator has to end the
activated response, the following rules have to be enforced in
the monitored system. We notice that we do not need to explic-
itly specify the counterpart of permissions and prohibitions,
because they are automatically deactivated when End(RespC)
is triggered. (See Section IV-B):
• Obligation(admin, endC notify, premium, ¬RespC , RespC )
• Obligation(admin, endC notify, normal, ¬RespC , RespC )
The second and fifth rules in RespC are defeasible obli-
gations, and thus the counterpart rules in ¬RespC are also
defeasible obligations. Finally, the triggering conditions of
these response contexts are:
• if [(Start(Threat)4 is true) and (CIThreat4 > 500)] then
Start(RespC ) is true
• if (Start(RespC ) is true) and [(End(Threat4) is true) or
(CIRespC (t) > CIThreat4 (t))] then End(RespC ) is true
Figure 3 depicts the mapping between the attack objectives, the
threat contexts and the response contexts. The generated attack
graph is used to calculate the success likelihood of ongoing
threats. Interested readers may refer to [24]. The attack graph
contains elementary attack steps that lead to the pre-identified
attack objectives.
C. Activating and Deactivating the Response Policy
Once the threat and response contexts are specified, they
can be used by the activation/deactivation framework and
architecture, as presented in Section V-B and Section VI.
Let us suppose that the attacker begins to flood the SIP
server using several infected machines. This attack incurs
a heavy DoS for the VoIP service (85%). Therefore, the
success likelihood of the attack objective Server DoS rises
dramatically. The associated threat Threat4 becomes active,
and thus the associated context Start(Threat4) is triggered.
The impact of this threat is a decrease in the availability of
the VoIP service for all clients (δA 6= 0; δC = δI = 0).
We consider that the incurred cost for each premium user
is δA = −1.5/min, while the cost for a normal user is
δA = −1/min with a delay of thirty minutes. Consequently,
normal users tolerate a thirty minutes service downtime, which
is not acceptable for premium users.
To counter this ongoing attack, the associated response
context Response3 is activated at time Tactiv = 0 min (by
activating Start(Response3)). In consequence, the remaining
resources are exclusively dedicated to the premium users,
while the normal users are denied of making or receiving calls.
The deactivation process of Response3 would be performed in
one of the following cases:
a) The Threat Vanishes: The deactivation of Threat4 is
due to a decrease of its success likelihood. For instance, if
the flooding bots are disinfected (See the attack graph in
Figure 3), the success likelihood of the ongoing threat will
decrease significantly (below 4), and therefore End(Threat4)
is activated: The evanishment of the ongoing threat leads to





















































Fig. 3. The mapping between attack objectives, threat contexts and response contexts of the VoIP case study.
b) The Threat Impact Decreases: In the second scenario
the threat remains present; in other words its success likelihood
does not decrease. However, its impact on the monitored
system decreases: for example the DoS magnitude falls from
85% to only 20% at t = 40 min. The threat impact may
decrease for several reasons, for instance:
1) The DoS level may decrease due to other tactic or
strategic response(s) that has been activated by the
monitored system (e.g. blocking traffic from attacker
domain, activation of backup servers)
2) The DoS level may decrease due to third party actions.
For instance, another operator blocked the attacking
machines after detecting the high level of outbound
traffic, or upon request from the monitored system (i.e.
the victim system, operator)
3) The attacker might have decided, for unknown or hidden
reasons, to reduce the DoS magnitude. For instance,
the attempt was undertaken in order to blackmail the
monitored system.



















Fig. 4. The cumulative impact of Threat4 drops below the cumulative
impact of Response3.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the cumulative impact of
Threat4 and ResponseC over time. We can notice also a rise
of the slopes of the two curves at t = 30 min, which is due to
the addition of normal users’ cost after their tolerance delay
had expired. The cost incurred by the activated ResponseC
becomes larger than the cost of the threat Threat4. Therefore,
the response policy must be deactivated immediately: the
associated event-based context End(ResponseC) is launched
at Tdeactiv ≈ 40min. Despite the response deactivation, the
threat context Threat4 remains active, because the threat is
always present. Moreover, this ensures that Start(RespC) could
be re-activated if the impact of Threat4 rises again.
c) The Response Impact exceeds the Threat Impact: In
the third scenario the threat remains present, and its success
likelihood does not decrease. Moreover, its impact remains
steady over time: the DoS level of the threat remains at 85%.
Figure 5 shows that at t = 68 min, the cumulative impact
of RespC becomes higher than the one of Threat4. Thus,
RespC is no more effective, and End(RespC) is launched at
Tdeactiv ≈ 68 min. Even though the response was deactivated,
the threat context Threat4 remains active to signal that the























Fig. 5. The cumulative impact of RespC exceeds the cumulative impact of
Threat4.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented first how to specify response
requirements as response policy with associated threat and
response contexts. We distinguished threat contexts from
response contexts, which was not done in previous work.
9The specification considers the security and response require-
ments at both the beginning and the end of the response.
In other words, the response policy indicates how responses
should be deployed when activated and deactivated, using
Start(Responsei) and End(Responsei). Moreover, a temporal
reaction and countermeasure taxonomy was proposed to help
the expert specify the aforementioned response contexts. Sec-
ond, a dynamic risk-aware framework to activate/deactivate
the responses was described. The framework considers the two
fundamental components of a risk: the success likelihood and
the impact of the threat. Moreover, the impact of the response
is also considered. Additionally, we introduced the cumulative
impact metric for threats and responses, in order to assess
the cumulative impact over time due to variation in confiden-
tiality, integrity and availability levels of monitored systems
and services. Third, an online architecture was proposed to
activate/deactivate and deploy response policies in real-time.
Finally, our work was validated using a VoIP service case
study.
However, we did not consider a dynamic enforcement of
response rules in the monitored system. Each response rule
was statically mapped into a generic script: if a response rule is
activated, the associated script is launched. [28] shows how to
enforce security rules while minimizing configuration changes
and reducing resource consumption. Such model can optimize
the enforcement of activated/deactivated response rules.
On the other hand, potential conflicts were handled by
assigning priorities to threat and response contexts. When a
conflict occurs, the rule with the highest priority is enforced.
As a first approach to resolve the issue, the prioritization
derived from the preliminary risk analysis (See Section IV-A)
was used: the response associated with the threat with a higher
risk, possesses a higher priority. Future work will focus on
a risk-aware transactional management of multiple responses
which may be activated/deactivated simultaneously.
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